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A B S T R A C T
In this paper we discuss the importance of framing the question of public acceptance of sustainable
energy transitions in terms of values and a ‘whole-system’ lens. This assertion is based on ﬁndings arising
from a major research project examining public values, attitudes and acceptability with regards to whole
energy system change using a mixed-method (six deliberative workshops, n = 68, and a nationally
representative survey, n = 2441), interdisciplinary approach. Through the research we identify a set of
social values associated with desirable energy futures in the UK, where the values represent identiﬁable
cultural resources people draw on to guide their preference formation about particular aspects of energy
system change. As such, we characterise public perspectives as being underpinned by six value clusters
relating to efﬁciency and wastefulness, environment and nature, security and stability, social justice and
fairness, autonomy and power, and processes and change. We argue that this ‘value system’ provides a
basis for understanding core reasons for public acceptance or rejection of different energy system aspects
and processes. We conclude that a focus on values that underpin more speciﬁc preferences for energy
system change brings insights that could provide a basis for improved dialogue, more robust decision-
making, and for anticipating likely points of conﬂict in energy transitions.
ã 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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It is widely accepted that transformations in energy systems will
be essential in realising low carbon energy transitions (DECC, 2011;
IEA, 2013; Bulkeley et al., 2013). Publics are deeply implicated in
energy transitions, for example as consumers and producers of
energy, as citizens with voting powers, or as active protesters and
proponents of energy infrastructures. As such, public acceptability is
recognised to be of critical importance in processes of energy system
transformation, with the potential to present both opportunities and
challenges for the delivery of energy policy. Public perspectives are,
however,oftennot includedinfuture energyscenarios. Wherepublic
views are depicted they tend to emerge as ‘imagined publics’ with
little grounding in empirical analysis (Walkeret al., 2010; Spence and
Pidgeon, 2009). In this paper, we present the results of an in-depth
empirical study of public attitudes and acceptability with regards to
energy transitions, delineating a set of public values for energy
system change.* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 29 2087 6020; fax: +44 29 2087 4858.
E-mail address: DemskiCC@cardiff.ac.uk (C. Demski).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.06.014
0959-3780/ã 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articThe research and analysis undertaken for this paper is based on
two assertions regarding the conceptualisation of public accept-
ability. First, we argue the need to go beyond examining public
attitudes toward individual system elements (e.g. nuclear energy),
and look instead at how they manifest in relation to interconnected
processes of whole energy system change. This enables us to
establish a more complex picture of public views by identifying
contingency and the relevance of trade-offs (e.g. between higher
costs and renewable energy) for public acceptability.
To elaborate, previous research on public attitudes, acceptabil-
ity and engagement with issues relevant to energy system change
has largely focused on single elements of change, e.g. carbon
capture and storage (CCS) or electric vehicles (see Whitmarsh et al.,
2011). There is a surprising paucity of research examining public
perspectives on the combined set of transformations that are
envisaged in policy, academic, third sector and industry scenarios
(e.g. DECC, 2010; WWF, 2011; Ekins et al., 2013; National Grid,
2014). Energy systems involve a complex array of supply and
demand technologies, resources, infrastructures, behaviours and
practices, as well as other elements associated with regulation,
policies, actors and institutions. Public acceptability will likely be
dependent upon the way transformations occur as a whole becausele under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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have been shown to depend on other aspects being realised (e.g.
the associated governance arrangements; see Wynne, 1996).
Recent research has begun to explore public perceptions
beyond individual aspects of change, for example by eliciting
views about portfolios of energy supply technologies (De Best-
Waldhober et al., 2009; Fleishman et al., 2010; Einseidel et al.,
2013). This work has, for example, shown strong preferences for
some energy technologies (e.g. renewables) over others (e.g. CCS;
Scheer et al., 2013). However, we further argue that research in this
ﬁeld must be attuned to the inherent complexities and issues of
scale that publics have to contend with when taking a broader view
of the energy system and its inherent interdependencies (Pidgeon
et al., 2014). To do this we take a ‘whole-system view’ considering
public perspectives on the combined set of supply and demand
transformations envisioned in UK national energy policy scenarios.
Second, we assert the need to consider public perspectives not
only in terms of attitudes and acceptability but also in terms of the
values and the more general concerns that underlie positive or
negative views of any particular technology or process. Much
research focuses on basic preferences – positive or negative
evaluations of something – with only limited research going
beyond these basic conceptualisations of public acceptability (e.g.
Curran, 2012). This approach does not account for the often highly
conditional nature of public views, such as the reluctant
acceptance of nuclear power when placed in the context of
climate change (Bickerstaff et al., 2008). As such, conditionality
(e.g. on particular policy, geographic, or social contexts) is an
important consideration when examining public perspectives.
The argument to consider values and more general concerns
that underlie speciﬁc responses or attitudes is further premised on
established research on public engagement with complex socio-
technical and risk issues (e.g. see Pidgeon et al., 1992; Wynne,
1992; Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998; Macnaghten, 2010). Building
from this body of work, we argue that because energy system
change encompasses highly complex sets of transformations,
framed at varied geographical and temporal scales, they contain
multiple elements that will be both unfamiliar to people, and
inherently uncertain. Under such circumstances people are
unlikely to have fully formed views, and a need therefore arises
to engage with the processes through which beliefs become
constituted (Macnaghten, 2010).
Although people might not come to engagement processes with
fully formed views, neither are responses constructed in a vacuum
(Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006). Public perspectives regarding
complex socio-technical issues are formed through a process of
interpreting new information with existing values, experiences,
worldviews and socio-cultural understandings about the world
(e.g. see Moscovici, 1984; Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998; Miller, 2000
Miller, 2000). Therefore we argue it is important to examine what
underpins expressed attitudes and preferences, and that this kind
of analysis might bring more meaningful theoretical and empirical
insights into public perspectives. Such insights can, in turn, form a
basis for improved dialogue, more robust decision-making, and for
anticipating likely points of conﬂict in transition processes (Butler
and Demski, 2013).
We explicate this argument through the remainder of the paper
beginning with a brief discussion of the conceptual literature on
values. We then present a detailed discussion of our methods and
analytic approach before outlining a set of values that broadly
underlie public attitudes toward energy system change. Here,
illustrative examples from the data are provided to complement a
narrative account of the values. We conclude by reﬂecting on the
signiﬁcance of the insights derived from the research for
understanding public acceptability with regards to energy system
change.2. Conceptual background
While the term ‘values’ is used in a multitude of domains
(politics, media, economics), it is important to note that the way it
is used within the social sciences is often more focused. In basic
terms, values refer to beliefs about how the world should be, and
capture personal and cultural principles about states of existence
and modes of conduct; they are ideals about what ought to happen
regardless of situational context (e.g. Fischhoff, 1993; Chan et al.,
2012). Varied disciplines within the social sciences differ, however,
in their precise deﬁnitions and meanings of values; e.g. from
cognitively held beliefs to cultural principles embedded in social
structures (e.g. Reser and Bentrupperbäumer, 2005; Douglas,1992;
Hards, 2011). Nonetheless, most stress the importance of
understanding values in the context of addressing wider societal
issues. For example, from a human geography perspective, Adger
et al. (2013) emphasise the importance of understanding cultural
values in climate change responses to ensure policies effectively
connect with what matters to communities. In psychological
literatures, the importance of incorporating values in science
communication to facilitate public deliberation and explore points
of contestation has been highlighted (Dietz, 2013). Others have
argued for the need to focus on shared social psychological and
environmental values, rather than individualistic preferences in
order to engage people with sustainability (Crompton, 2011;
Corner et al., 2014).
Much of the psychological literature has focused on deﬁning
universal human values, theorised to reside as cognitive repre-
sentations within individuals (e.g. Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004; Maio,
2010). By contrast socio-cultural approaches move the emphasis
away from individual cognition to denote values as salient cultural
resources (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Wynne, 1996; Jasanoff
and Kim, 2013). From this perspective values do not reside within
individuals but have a public character; they are socially
constituted and derived from interactions in the world. Further,
values are not theorised as drivers or causal determinates of social
action, but as ideals that require people to engage pragmatically
with material and social arrangements that are not consistent with
them. Central to this is the signiﬁcance of scale and the ways that
people constantly need to change the scope of their engagement,
shifting between modes that are engaged in local or individual
circumstances and those oriented towards the general or the
‘public’ (Thevenot, 2001; Butler et al., 2013).
We align here with this latter conceptualisation of values, by
adopting the societal level as our principal unit of analysis
(Hechter, 1993). Accordingly, we present a shared set of social values
that pertain speciﬁcally to energy system change and invoke a
mode of engagement that is oriented toward the general or the
‘public’, rather than the speciﬁc or personal. This is, in part, because
the analysis in this paper aims to provide insight into what shapes
acceptability of energy pathways at a societal level, building
understanding of the culturally embedded ideals and general
concerns that underlie speciﬁc preferences. The idea of a shared set
of values, or a value system has precedence in other research and
conceptual work (e.g. Brown, 1984).
In this research we draw on conceptions where the value set
represents prevalent identiﬁable cultural resources or collectively
imagined forms of the social good through which people anchor
their understandings and formulate their preferences (Douglas
and Wildavsky, 1982; Jasanoff and Kim, 2013). As such, the kinds of
values we draw out of our own work with publics might be better
conceptualised as expressions of ideals circulating within society
as cultural discourses (Hards, 2011). In line with this, we do not
assume that the identiﬁed value clusters are ordered in a speciﬁc
way (unlike for example Schwarz, 1992), but do acknowledge that
individuals have to engage pragmatically with values in a given
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shift and change over time and scale. That said, precisely because
they are culturally held shared conceptions of how the world
should be, they are more deeply entrenched and less malleable
than might otherwise be expected. In this sense, though they are
not determinative, the values we set out give important insights
into what helps shape social responses to energy systems.
The current analysis of public values for energy system change
is therefore aimed at better understanding, not necessarily of
individual acceptance or rejection of whole transition pathways,
but rather of the kinds of concerns citizens bring to bear on a
decision-making process regarding potential energy pathways.
The identiﬁed value system connects to and facilitates the
presentation of a broader vision for energy system change. In this
sense, the values identiﬁed in this research might be thought of as a
set of socially determined criteria that can be used as the basis for
considering social dimensions within decision-making about
energy transition processes.
3. Methods
The analysis in this paper brings together ﬁndings from a major
programme of interdisciplinary research examining public values
with regards to energy system change in the UK (Pidgeon et al.,
2014). The empirical basis of the analysis comes from two
interlinked research phases, namely six in-depth public delibera-
tive workshops (n = 68), and a nationally GB representative online
survey (n = 2441).
3.1. Sampling
Each deliberative workshop was held over a full day with 11–12
participants. The aim was to attain as diverse a set of societal
perspectives as possible so that any emergent themes could be
regarded as indicative of public concerns across a broad cross-
section of people (Jasanoff, 2003). This sampling technique builds
from the theoretical proposition that differential characteristics
(such as age, where you live) will be linked to different kinds of life
experience. In turn, different forms of life experience are expected
to result in the emergence of varying perspectives (Strauss and
Corbin, 1990).Public workshops  (Butler et al., 2013 )
• Each workshop  met for a full day to discuss  and  delib
transitions in several ways. 
• Throug h small group  discussion s participants were en
aspects of the energy system and possible transitions.
by the use of the my205 0 scenario tool (Fig. 2); the to 
prompts,  and  encouraged the con siderati on of link s b
• Further dialogue was prompted using  scenario narrati
of an ordinary person  living in three different energy
National online survey (n=2,44 1; Demski et al.,  20 13
• The main qu estionn aire encompassed qu estion s on  pe
to energy system change and energy  futures,  includ in 
• 1. Policy framings such as climate chang e, energy se
energy sup ply option s includ ing fossil  fuels, nuclear 
Electrification of cook ing , driving and  heating ; 4. De
side management issues; and  5. Overall  system chang 
• Respond ents were then asked to complete a version  o
2), and  answer follow-up  qu esti ons abou t their create
Fig. 1. Key procedural information for the two empirical resTherefore, participants were sampled to ensure a mix of gender,
age, ethnicity, socio-economic grouping, household type, and
educational qualiﬁcations. Additionally, workshops were under-
taken in different rural and urban locations across the UK to ensure
diversity in experiences speciﬁcally related to energy (e.g. different
types of housing, transport infrastructure, proximity to generating
facilities), as well as across governance and cultural contexts
(England, Wales and Scotland). London, Cardiff and Edinburgh
were selected as three major UK cities and three more rural sites,
Cumbria, Merthyr Tydﬁl and areas south of Glasgow, were selected
for their proximity to energy infrastructures (nuclear, coal, and
wind respectively). With these parameters, recruitment was
undertaken by a professional company.
For the quantitative phase, the authors developed a survey
instrument in conjunction with the social research company Ipsos
MORI, which collected data using an online questionnaire between
2nd and 12th August 2012. A nationally representative quota
sample of British adults (England, Scotland and Wales) aged 18
years and older was recruited to reﬂect gender, geographic region,
age, and employment status using data from the Labour Force
Survey 2006 (UK Data Service, 2006). Response rates are not
indicative when using online quota-sampling as non-response
cannot be easily deﬁned (Dillman, 2007). Nonetheless, the drop-
out rate (22%) was in line with other surveys of this kind and evenly
distributed across all sections of the survey. Data obtained were
broadly representative of characteristics sampled and then
weighted to be representative of these same characteristics for
further analysis.
3.2. Design
The two research strands elicited public views on the
interconnected nature of energy system change at multiple scales,
including different supply technologies, patterns of demand and
behaviour, and governance and regulatory structures. Both
research phases were carefully designed with input from a wider
multidisciplinary team of academics, stakeholder interviews, an
advisory panel, and existing literature. Fig. 1 broadly describes the
survey and workshop design, but further details are given in two
respective reports (see Butler et al., 2013; Demski et al., 2013 for
Supplementary material).erate who le energy  system 
cou raged to deliberate diff erent 
 This discuss ion was facilitated 
ol provided structure and  
etween system elements. 
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interconnected nature of energy transitions (for detailed discus-
sion see Pidgeon et al., 2014). Two issues are especially relevant for
the analysis in this paper; (1) the ways in which ‘the whole system’
was kept in view when eliciting public perspectives; and (2) how
we were able to access the deeper concerns that underlie people’s
preferences.
3.2.1. The deliberative workshops
Reﬂecting well established lines of argument in public
participatory research, the deliberative workshops were designed
to engage members of the public as active, imaginative agents,
eliciting their insights relating to energy system change (Jasanoff
2003; Fischer, 1999). Three key modes of engagement were used.
First, an open phase of whole group discussion involved
participants reﬂecting on the major policy issues underlying
reasons for change (e.g. climate change, energy security) and on
the idea of the whole energy system (a concept that was unfamiliar
to many). Second, in-depth discussions about energy system
change were structured around the completion of the my2050
scenario tool (Fig. 2) which served to provide a whole systems
perspective. This tool was utilised as a backdrop for more open
discussion and we were careful to prompt on issues that were not
included (e.g. air travel).
Third, we presented three energy system scenario narratives1
detailing “a day in the life” of an ordinary person living in different
energy futures. Participants were encouraged to reﬂect further on
their expressed preferences for energy system change and consider
the implications for everyday life. These three modes of engage-
ment enabled participants to consider their views within the
context of the whole energy system. As facilitators we prompted
these reﬂections, for example, highlighting possibilities for higher
costs associated with particularly desirable system conﬁgurations,
such as high renewable scenarios. The resulting discussions were
transcribed verbatim, anonymised and checked by a third party for
accuracy.Fig. 2. The my2050 scenario tool illustrating the seven supply-side sliders. The tool is a s
supply and demand-side options (including nuclear energy, fossil fuel generation, ren
changes) in order to reduce the UK’s carbon emissions by 80% compared to 1990. It was in
Energy and Climate Change and Sciencewise-ERC. A version of this tool can be found here
United Kingdom’s Open Government License v2.0).3.2.2. The national survey
Although it is difﬁcult to conduct a survey that keeps the whole
system in mind, and accesses values, the survey was also
speciﬁcally designed to achieve this. First, questions were
constructed to examine basic preferences and acceptability as
well as conditionality, attached concerns, and the contexts in
which preferences might differ. This allowed inferences to be
drawn about public acceptability beyond simple support for and
opposition toward proposed changes (for similar approaches see
De Best-Waldhober et al., 2009). Primarily we developed our
understanding through examining patterns of responses to
different questions, and to see if key features prompted signiﬁcant
changes in responses.
Second, the survey also included the my2050 tool (Fig. 2) which
provided respondents with an opportunity to translate their
preferences for individual elements of change into the context of
creating a whole system scenario. For us as researchers this
provided another point at which people would express preferences
that could be compared to previous answers. Finally, insights were
additionally derived by using open-ended questions about the
reasoning underlying preferences. This provided a large dataset of
qualitative responses that were analysed for emerging patterns,
underlying concerns and consistency with the workshop dis-
cussions.
3.3. Analysis and synthesis
3.3.1. Combining data sets
Collecting multiple datasets using multiple methods was a
deliberate design choice and it was important to include an
analytic phase which explicitly brought the different research
strands together to understand their combined insight. The
qualitative and quantitative elements offered different qualities
that were important to the synthesis analysis. For example, the
survey was able to provide a certain weight to particular ﬁndings
due to its large nationally representative sample (e.g. the strong
preference to reduce fossil fuels), whereas the ﬂexibility of theimpliﬁed representation of the UK energy system. It enables exploration of different
ewables, demand reduction, low carbon transport and heating systems, lifestyle
itially developed by the digital democracy company Delib for the UK Department of
: www.my2050.decc.gov.uk. (Contains public sector information licensed under the
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to emerge (e.g. the importance of distrust in energy companies)
and offered greater means for probing what underpinned
preferences. In this way the synthesized ﬁndings could be
sufﬁciently deliberative but also stand to reﬂect wider, nationally
held public views.
Although the design and delivery of both research phases was
important in enabling our understanding of values, the analytic
process itself was central to developing insight into the concerns
underlying expressed preferences of whole energy system change.
The analytic process considered the data as a whole and examined
different data streams in light of each other. In this way, the
ﬁndings and interpretations that arose from one set of data were
both complemented and challenged by those arising from the
others. Different methodological approaches can consider the
same issue from different perspectives and hence consistency
across datasets speaks to the strength of a particular ﬁnding.
Similarly divergences can highlight particular complexities and
important areas of uncertainty (Bryman, 2006).
Although the analysis was in many respects novel, it was
grounded in well-established techniques arising from mixed
method research. The approach involved the development of an
‘integrative logic’ through a form of thematic analysis (Mason,
2002). Insights from both phases were combined to generate a
wide-ranging set of meta-themes that connected preferences with
the underlying concerns that explained them. Themes were then
reﬁned through an iterative process whereby we examined and re-
examined data, and compared and dissected emergent themes via
discussions amongst the research team. The resulting outcomes
were the most important concerns that underlie both positive and
negative views across multiple different aspects of change, which
we characterise as public values. The analytic process ensured that
values were never drawn from one data point but instead reﬂected
careful and rigorous interpretation of the data as a whole (i.e.
across survey preference questions, workshop transcripts, my2050
scenario responses in both phases, and open-ended survey
responses).
3.3.2. Getting at values
The focus of this analysis was to examine values which
underpin public preferences for energy system change. It is
important to note that we did not map a speciﬁc value theory onto
the data; the analysis was wholly data-driven with all values
analytically derived from the combined data streams.
People reveal values both explicitly and implicitly (Kluckhohn,
1951) and there were two primary ways in which values were
elicited. First, values were explicitly stated or evident in participant
discussions and question responses, for example when explaining
their positive or negative attitudes towards a technology or aspect
of energy system change. For instance, participants explicitly
talked about their aversion to ‘waste’ in multiple places in the data.
Second, values were derived through a more detailed interpre-
tative process whereby underlying concerns were inferred from
the expression of concerns about key issues (Satterﬁeld, 2001). For1 The scenario narratives (fully detailed in Butler et al., 2013) were developed
from a range of scenario sources (e.g. DECC, 2010; UKERC, 2011; WWF, 2011 WWF,
2011) and from information attained through interviews with expert sources. They
were designed to reﬂect three plausible future energy system scenarios. 1. A
“business as usual” scenario depicting continuing reliance on fossil fuels along with
associated impacts relating to climate change and energy security. 2. A highly
technological response to energy issues depicting use of technologies like carbon
capture and storage and nuclear energy along with some renewable energy
deployment and a small amount of change on the demand side. 3. A scenario
centred on high levels of renewable deployment and correspondingly higher levels
of change to the demand side.example, the values associated with social justice were interpreted
as underlying prevalent and deep concerns about the fair
distribution of beneﬁts and consequences related to particular
choices.
Combinations of this interpretative approach and explicit
statements were important in many cases for the constitution of
values. For instance, views on energy security and demand side
management were underpinned by concerns about autonomy and
power, which at times were explicitly stated and at other times
could be clearly inferred from reasoning about these aspects of
change. The following provides a narrative account of the values
that were derived from the data.
4. Findings and discussion
We outline 15 values grouped into six thematic clusters to
comprise what we term a public value system for energy system
change. The values represent ideals and principles that underpin
normative visions for change; that is, they concern beliefs about
how things should be not about how they are currently. The
narrative for each value set starts with a statement about what the
value cluster encompasses, which is then elaborated by providing
illustrative examples from the research.
The narrative account is not exhaustive but aims to provide a
balance between breadth (e.g. where the value is relevant for
explaining people’s preferences) and depth (e.g. how the value
connects to evaluations of energy system change). Table 1 provides
illustrative empirical data points which are indicative of the forms
of data utilised to arrive at the speciﬁed values. However, it is not
possible to show how the values emerge at every point in the data
in a paper of this length, and it is also important to acknowledge
that each given example will never speak fully to a speciﬁc value
(for a full presentation of the data please see three reports that
have been published separately—Parkhill et al., 2013). The value
clusters are interlinked and overlapping. The categorisations that
are presented were derived through the analysis and offer the best
descriptors overall for the most prevalent concerns.
4.1. Public values for energy system change
The ﬁrst value cluster is called Efﬁcient and Not Wasteful. This
cluster aligns with an energy system that does not involve wasting
or producing waste products, and which is efﬁcient in a broad
sense. The values in this cluster were derived from explicit
preferences for efﬁciency in many parts of the system, negative
attitudes towards waste both in terms of products and processes,
and positive views on the reuse of waste products (for illustrative
data points see Table 1).
Efﬁciency as a concept emerges frequently within public
responses to questions about energy system change. In general,
efﬁciency is viewed as achieving the same thing with less, or
putting the same amount in but getting more out. Being more
efﬁcient is often linked to perceptions of improvement, where
increased efﬁciency is seen as a sign of progress.
In contrast, wasting or producing waste is seen as inherently
negative and something to be avoided. A core example of where
concern about waste underpins public preferences relates to
reducing energy use, but negative perceptions of ‘wasting’ also
extend beyond ‘energy’ (e.g. wasting food, time, opportunities).
This is strongly linked to the perception that energy is currently
wasted in many respects; common examples given by our
participants include stand-by functions, and energy use in public
and commercial buildings. Concerns around wasting energy are
particularly heightened in the context of wasting something that is
perceived as ﬁnite, most obviously fossil fuels.
Table 1
Illustrative data points for each of the six identiﬁed social value clusters, and broader public vision for energy system change. Any single data point may relate to more than
one value cluster.
VALUE CLUSTER
Description                                               Values  
Illustrative data points
(qualitative and  quantitative)
EFFICIENT  AND  NOT  WASTEF UL
“If you  walk aroun d a major city at nigh t the bu ilding s are ablaze…there’s no bod y in them bu t they’re al l lit and up tha t’s a 
waste of energy. The Londo n Eye is ve ry pretty lit up but there’s no reason to be lit up  for that long.”
1/3 of the 73% of  respondents that agree d Britain nee ds to reduce  the amoun t of  energ y it  uses thought that a lot of  energy is 
cur rentl y being ‘wasted’ , ‘u sed unnecess aril y’ and ‘taken fo r granted’.
“We create waste an d it ha s to be got rid of an d you just can’t keep bu rying  it so  you have to do something wit h it.”
“If it is recyc led I ha ve no  problem wit h it [biofuel], but if it is a crop that’s specifically grow n for fuel then no , not when 
you’ve  go t starving Et hiop ia or whereve r else.” [also see  Just and Fair, Process  and  Change]
Over 80 % of  respondents includ ed high levels of efficiency improv ements fo r homes and business  in their 20 50 energ y 
sce narios submi tted as part of the survey.
“Why aren’t we inve sting in it? [electric cars] We sho uld be world leaders  in it.”
“That’s a new sou rce of jobs [d eveloping tidal energ y]– we ha ve no job s to give anybody – it ’s work….that is ou r future, isn’ t 
it. So if that is ou r future an d it’s going to be clean, safe an d create job s – becau se then you’ ll have all you r eng ineers,  you’ ve 
got the buil ders  and things …”  [also see  Environment and Nature, Sec ure and Stable]
A system that does not involve 
wasti ng and /or produce s waste 
produ cts and that is eff icient. 
A system that does not waste 
opp ortunities arising from 
energy system chang e, and 
capitali ses on the resource s 
and ca pacities of  the UK.
Avo iding Waste
Eff iciency
Capturing 
opp ortun ities
ENVIRON MENT AND  NATURE 79% of  respondents beli eve the UK should reduce  it s use of  fossil  fuels.  When asked why, respondents most often mentioned 
the unsustainable nature of fossil  fuels (‘ finite/runn ing out’; 48%)  and environmental harm (includi ng clim ate chang e; 36%) 
as reasons for holding this viewpoint. 
88% of  respondents perce ive wind energy to be a clean source of elec tricit y.
“[renewab le energy]…nobod y’s getting hu rt. The planet’s not getti ng hu rt. You’ re using  something tha t is natural.”
“…coa l an d oil is natural but the wind  kee ps coming an d coming … it will  always kee p giving  us wind .”
A system that uses and 
produce s energy in an 
environmentally 
conscious way and does 
not unnecess aril y 
interfere wit h, or harm, 
nature.
Environmental protection
Nature  and  naturalness
SEC URITY AND  STABILT Y “…the thing  I wou ld be more con cerned wit h wou ld be the elec tricity bec oming un aff ordable bec ause we rely on it a lot and 
of cours e [other pa rticipant] was saying tha t it is going to be a bit frigh tening  for the youn ger generati on”  [also see  Just and 
Fair]
83% of  respondents are fairly or very concern ed that in the next 10 -20 years elec tricit y and  gas wil l become un affordable for 
them. 78% of respondents are conce rned that petrol wil l become unaffordable fo r them.
“[Abou t using public tran spo rt] I live in the middle of no where so I have to have a car. I work in variou s place s; I couldn’t 
get to any of them withou t my own tran spo rt.” [also see  Just and Fair]
“We loo ked at all sorts of things, we loo ked at groun d pu mps…and  all these won derful systems an d we aske d abo ut 9 heating 
eng inee rs aroun d and …basically you cou ldn’ t find  an yone to do an ything  at all so…we ended up  wit h the bog -standa rd 
combi -boiler.”
52% of  respondents agree  that nu clea r power is a hazard  to hu man hea lth; and only 26%  beli eve it  is safe. In contrast, 81% of  
respondents agree  that wind energy is safe, and only 5%  beli eve it  to be a hazard  to human health.
A system that ensures acce ss
to energ y services both in 
terms of  avail abilit y and 
affordabil ity.  A system that is 
reliable and  safe both in the 
produ cti on and deli very of 
energy service s.
Ava ilability and 
affordabil ity
Reli ability
Safety
SOCIAL  JUSTICE  AND  FA IRNESS
54% of  respondents think the national gov ernment should be mainly responsible fo r ensuring  that approp riate changes are 
made to the UK energy system over the next 40 years. Respo nsibilit y was also subscribed to energy companies (16% ) and 
individuals (13% ). These findings should be interpreted in ligh t of  the finding s from the quali tative workshops:
“Part of the problem is that they have opened up the market place and  the marke t place no w dictates wha t we pa y whereas 
before it was ce ntralised an d gove rnment -led and a fair price for all, now we swap  and  the next week  they put their price s up 
and you wish you  stayed wit h tha t one.” 
“I think it does need to be unif orm becau se at the minute we are playing in a monop oly an d we are losing bec ause they are 
getti ng mega big bu cks from the profit s.” [also see  Autonomy and Power]
“I generally worr y abou t the price becau se the way thing s are going, is like you kno w you  wake  up the foll owing  day and  the 
energy compa ny wil l just tell me tha t there will  be an  increase in price, an d there is no thing you  can do abo ut it.”
“El ectricity compan ies ob viou sly…have  some owners hip of it as they have ha d so many years  of profit making and offering us 
gas an d electric, definitely they have to take some respon sibili ty.”
A system that is 
developed in ways which 
are mi ndful of 
impli cations for pe ople’s 
abili ties to live hea lthy 
lives. A system that is 
fair and  inclusive and 
where all actors are 
honest and  transparent 
abo ut their acti ons.
Social justice
Fairness , honesty,  and 
transparency
AUTONO MY  AND P OWER 82% of  participants are very of fairly concern ed about the UK becomi ng too dependent on energy from other coun tries.
78% of  respondents fo und app liance s such as digital bo xes,  TVs and  compu ters automaticall y turning  off  if they are left on 
standb y for a considerable amount of  tim e acce ptable. 47 % fo und the foll owing sce nario acce ptable: Your  shower turn ing off 
after a set period of tim e. However,  only 30%  fo und a sce nario acce ptable in which fridg e or fridge -free zers would be 
swit ched off by an elec tricit y network operator for short periods of tim e (provided the temperature of  the fridg e/free zer 
remains within a ce rtain spec ified range).
“I’d quite object if somebo dy else had tha t con trol…I fi nd that a bit draconian actually…It’s a bit like George Orwell , that… 
‘It has dec reed you must ha ve’  – that reall y anno ys me.”
A system that is developed 
in ways that do not overly 
threaten autonomy, 
infring e up on free doms,  or 
significa ntly compromi se 
abili ties to control personal 
aspec ts of li fe.
Autonomy and  fre edom
Choice  and  control
PROCESS  AND  CHANG E “Well , all the installation of the electric and  solar pan els, the bio fields, it is no t going to hap pen overnight,  all of thi s is 
gradua lly go ing  to come into ou r live s, bu t it is a really goo d vision.”  
“We are using these sho rt term resou rces so it [CCS] feels like it is a sho rt term soluti on, maybe just clean ing up as opp osed 
to let’s loo k at this aga in and  let’s loo k to the future long er term eve n bey ond  205 0.” 
“I feel uneasy ab out it [growing  energy crop s]…We have a growing  pop ulation,  we ha ven’t got a dying  popu lation  in the 
world,  peop le ha ve to live somewhere so that mean s land is take n up wit h hou sing , indu stries, tran sport systems,  so do we 
then start buying piece s of land  or going to war becaus e we nee d Africa’ s bit of land …?”
“Thing s shou ld be invented an d improved.”
“I think it’s [stopp ing flying] a backwards step an d I kno w tha t’s really controvers ial and stuff but I think for me you know 
living an d exploring an d pu shing  bounda ries is something that’s really impo rtan t to wha t makes us who we are.”
A system that is developed 
wit h a focus on the long -term 
trajec tories being crea ted; that 
takes into acc ount system 
interconnecti ons and 
interdependencies; and 
represents improvement both 
in terms of socio-
tec hnological advance s and 
qualit y of li fe.
Long-term trajec tories
Interconnec ted
Improv ement and  
quality
Core  prefere nces/Public vision for energy  system 
change
Illustrative data points
(qualitative and quantitati ve)
REDUCED ENER GY  USE OVE RALL  AND  
REDUCED USE OF FINITE RE SOURCE S
73% of  respondents agree  that Britain should reduce  the amoun t of  energy it  uses. 
79% beli eve the UK should reduce  its use of  fossil  fuels.
When creati ng their own 205 0 energy future sce narios, on average,  respondents did not make more changes to one side of the 
energy system over another (demand  vs.  supply side).
“Just becau se I kno w tha t, it just make s me feel a bit safer knowing  that it [renewab le energy] is always go ing to be there, 
whereas when you hear the peop le, you  kno w, wit h the doomsda y theory that it ’s [foss il fuels] go ing  to run out an d we ha ve 
nothing  left, tha t wou ld be a worr y in the back of my head , becau se I kno w tha t I’ ll have to deal with it at some po int, an d I 
kno w tha t my kids will  definitely have  to deal wit h it.” [also see  Just and Fair, Environment and  Nature]
A system that reduce s ov erall  energy  usage while 
simultaneously re ducing the use of finite 
resource s (as compared to the current state).
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resources that are perceived as naturally abundant in the UK,
such as marine energy or wind. This concern is also linked to
positive views on the need to maximise opportunities in relation to
job and industry creation and develop technologies associated
with these abundant resources (e.g. leading marine energy
developments globally; Table 1).
Furthermore, the idea of producing waste is seen as problematic,
primarily because of the consequences, such as ongoing health and
environmental hazards, and requirements for continuous man-
agement. To illustrate, this concern underpinned negative views of
nuclear energy and carbon emission storage (i.e. in CCS proposals).
In contrast, publics have positive views towards the reuse of waste
products, for example, biomass from waste products (e.g. food
waste) is viewed more favourably than grown-for-purpose energy
crops.
Within this ﬁrst value cluster we can already note that these
values connect to individual elements of system change in both
positive and negative ways. Connections between values start to
become apparent because more than one value informs responses
to a speciﬁc aspect of change. For example, producing waste is seen
as inherently negative, in part, because it is associated with
negative impacts for the environment and human health. This
relates to the second value cluster, Environment and Nature.
Core to this cluster is the ideal that the energy system should
avoid producing pollutants and should not contribute to, or at the
very least avoid detracting from, the general healthiness and
wellbeing of society. Overall, the values in this cluster were derived
from negative perceptions of environmental harm underpinning
preferences for and against multiple energy system technologies
and processes. These include both general environmental harm,
e.g. by contribution to climate change and pollution, and more
speciﬁc concerns around possible contamination (e.g. oil spills,
radioactive waste leakages, disposal of toxins) (for illustrative data
points see Table 1). It is within this cluster that concerns about
climate change manifest in public perspectives towards energy
system change. However, climate change represents just one issue
within a more general concern about environmental degradation.
In this sense, concerns about environmental protection also go
beyond nature and wildlife, to encompass issues regarding the
relationship between nature and society.
To illustrate, this value cluster underpins a common compari-
son between negative perceptions of fossil fuels and positive
perceptions of renewable energy technologies. Whereas renew-
able energy is seen as clean and as having limited waste by-
products; fossil fuels are widely perceived as dirty as well as
environmentally and socially damaging. Similarly, renewables are
seen as part of a natural process tapping into an inﬁnite resource
that is not signiﬁcantly altered by society’s use of it (e.g. the wind
will keep blowing whether or not a wind turbine harnesses it to
produce electricity, Table 1), whereas fossil fuels are seen as
artiﬁcial and intrusive with regards to the necessary manufactur-
ing processes to make use of them (e.g. raw resource extraction and
combustion).
Whilst we would argue that participants understood that the
formation of fossil fuels were the result of natural processes, the
timescales in which they form mean that it does not hold the same
sense of being an inﬁnite resource as renewable energy. We further
argue that these considerations also, in part, explain why biomass
or biofuels are not seen as renewable in the same way as other
renewable technologies; i.e. because there appears to be a more
signiﬁcant potential for them to be mismanaged, depleted, and
ultimately cause harm to the environment and society.
This last point concerning the safety and well-being of the
environment leads on to the third set of values identiﬁed within
our datasets; Security and Stability. Core to this cluster is the idealthat the energy system should ensure access to energy services for
all members of society, and that it should produce and deliver
those energy services in a reliable and safe way. The values in this
cluster were primarily derived from expressed concerns around
the safety of different technologies, discussions about the risks
posed by transition processes for different groups of people, and
the recognition that energy needs to be accessible and reliable for
society to function properly (for illustrative data points see
Table 1).
To elaborate, the desirability of ‘safe’ systems related to
concerns about those involved in working within the energy
system (e.g. workers at a power station) and those living in close
vicinity to any infrastructure (e.g. power stations or pylons). We
found greater acceptance of events with limited local negative
impacts (e.g. a wind turbine breaking down) than those more
signiﬁcant negative events that have a lower probability of
occurring (e.g. a nuclear accident). This is suggestive of the
importance participants placed on the consequences of safety
lapses when evaluating energy systems.
Considerations of security and stability also manifest in views
on how the energy system should be developed. Underpinning
several preferences was the concern that implementing change
should not put people or businesses at risk of negative impacts
whether they are ﬁnancial, social, cultural or material. Conse-
quently, where risk is inherent in proposed changes, publics held
expectations for measures to be taken to mitigate them. One
example of such measures from the data was providing an
extended warranty for early adopters of fully electric vehicles.
The security and stability cluster also encompasses concern
about the reliability and dependability of the energy system,
meaning that efforts should be undertaken to minimise the impact
of shocks and address stresses (e.g. resource scarcity, service
interruptions and/or cost ﬂuctuations). This is important to people
because of the detrimental effects associated with interruptions to
services, both in terms of personal effects (e.g. not being able to
heat the home) and national effects (e.g. negative effects on the
economy). This desire arises out of recognition that energy is
integral to all parts of our society and when a shock or stress
manifests it poses a threat to every aspect of life. We would argue
that there is an underlying expectation that energy needs will
always be met in a well-functioning society. Indeed, a core aspect
of this value cluster concerns the accessibility of energy services,
both in terms of the availability of energy to support services and
people’s personal ability to afford them (Table 1). With regards to
perceptions of affordability, though we ﬁnd that the notion of
cheap energy is desirable, the core concern relates to energy being
affordable relative to income levels. In this regard, our data suggest
that energy is perceived as a basic need and people therefore see
the provision of governmental support as important to ensure
energy is available and accessible for all.
This set of values also encompasses concern about the
accessibility of proposed energy system changes in other ways.
For example, those who wish to implement an energy intervention
such as insulation, solar panels, or new heating systems, should be
supported to do so. Here, support refers not only to affordability
and access to investment capital, but also factors such as the
availability of skills and infrastructures (e.g. accredited suppliers
and maintenance providers; see Table 1). The idea of supporting
changes by making them accessible is further related to the notion
that elements of transition should not be imposed on people.
Rather, people should be supported to enact changes that best suit
their contexts. To illustrate this, participants expressed the view
that it would be inappropriate to apply the same penalties to rural
as to urban dwellers for using personal transport (Table 1).
Issues of security and stability within energy system change
also relate to the value cluster of Social justice and Fairness. This
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developed in ways which are mindful of implications for people’s
abilities to live healthy lives (see Schlosberg, 2004), and is fair and
inclusive where all actors are honest and transparent about their
actions. Values in this cluster were derived particularly from
publics referring to the fair distribution of risks and beneﬁts for
different groups of people (e.g. cost, ability to make a living), how
these are managed within energy system transitions, and how such
responsibilities are distributed (for illustrative data points see
Table 1).
To elaborate, evident within the data are concerns related to the
perceived differential impacts of alternative energy system options
for both people and environment. For example, concerns were
evident in relation to costs (i.e. social, environmental, ﬁnancial
impacts) of energy systems disproportionately affecting those that
were vulnerable or structurally disadvantaged in other ways (e.g.
the fuel poor). We ﬁnd that such concerns related not only to
people now and in Britain but also to those in distant locales (e.g.
people living in countries where food shortages might be created
or exacerbated through biofuel production, Table 1) and in
different times (e.g. future generations), bringing to mind issues
of intra- and inter-generational justice (for discussion see
Schlosberg, 2004; Barry, 1997). One instance of this relates to
public perceptions of particular forms of energy as holding
potential to generate global conﬂicts. Based on our interpretations,
this concern in part underlies preferences for reductions in use of
fossil fuels and people’s ambivalence about bioenergy. A further
example relates to issues participants identiﬁed in the distribution
of infrastructure affecting some people more negatively than
others and how these differential effects can be ampliﬁed over
time, i.e. energy facilities disproportionately affecting particular
locales and giving rise to repeated and residual injustices (Mohai
et al., 2009).
Within our data, we also ﬁnd social justice concerns connected
to questions about who might get left behind as particular
technologies, skills sets, and so forth, become obsolete. Here the
justice issues are related to the same core concern about the
impacts on people’s ability to live healthy lives but refer to energy
system elements that are anticipated to be far less signiﬁcant in the
future (e.g. coal). It encompasses a view that transition processes
should be undertaken in such a way as to ensure people are able to
adapt to changing living contexts and given proper consideration
through, for example, support in developing alternative livelihoods
(e.g. retraining for new jobs).
Values around justice and fairness also connect to public views
on speciﬁc actors within energy system change (Table 1). We ﬁnd a
core belief that institutions related to energy systems should be
honest, open and committed to principles of fairness. Concerns
with transparency also arise from the notion that if there is nothing
untoward happening, there should be nothing to hide. Within our
data, this forms a basis for negative perceptions of the seemingly
opaque operations of energy companies and governments in
existing energy systems (e.g. our participants perceived reasons for
price increases as unclear and energy bills as misleading).
Furthermore, these concerns are linked to preferences with
regards to affordability and the mechanisms for ﬁnancing
transitions. In particular, there was a view that the distribution
of energy system costs should be fair. For example, those actors
that have beneﬁtted ﬁnancially from existing systems should have
greater responsibility for the ﬁnancing of low carbon transitions,
rather than costs being passed on to consumers. These values also
underpin public perceptions about energy company proﬁts which
were seen as unfair in a context where people were experiencing
fuel poverty and where companies were able to monopolise and
limit consumer choice. Overall, current market arrangements in
the UK were perceived as not beneﬁtting consumers in the waysthat they should. We would therefore argue that publics have
strong concerns about what is essentially the vertical integration of
wholesale and retail, and the liberalisation of energy markets
because these are not seen to ensure the attainment of a just and
fair energy system.
These concerns further relate to the value cluster Autonomy
and Power. This cluster highlights public concerns about the need
to ensure that changes being undertaken do not threaten
autonomy or signiﬁcantly compromise personal control and
freedom. The values here are derived from prevalent concerns
about freedom of choice and maintaining autonomy both at the
national and personal scale (see Table 1 for illustrative data points).
To elaborate, there was a desire evident from the research that
no single institution, group or actor should become so powerful
that they can monopolise the energy system and manipulate it to
their own advantage (Table 1). This ﬁnding is, in part, reﬂected in
negative views about the domination of large energy companies in
the current UK system, leading to the perceived unfair distribution
of cost and beneﬁts. These concerns about Autonomy and Power
further manifest in connection with changes that relate to
domestic demand-side management (DSM). Within our data, we
ﬁnd public support for being enabled to shift personal demand (e.g.
through advice and information) but more negative and condi-
tional views with regards to changes and technologies which are
perceived as imposed or externally controlled (e.g. remote control
by a third party; see Table 1 and Spence et al., 2015).
We would further argue that these values, in part, explain
favourable views towards micro-generation technologies. For
example, one reason why solar PV or wood-burning ﬁres were
viewed positively was because they were seen to afford a form of
self-sufﬁciency and autonomy. Though our ﬁndings have generally
focused on centralised energy systems, from the values attached to
micro-generation technologies we can infer that aspects of
decentralised energy systems may be seen as (highly) desirable,
at least to the extent that they align with these values—i.e.
affording self-sufﬁciency and security, being seen as facilitating
greater distribution of beneﬁts.
Concerns about both autonomy and control are also evident at
national levels. For instance, negative public views about national
dependency on energy imports are, in part, underpinned by
concerns about autonomy. This does not necessarily mean,
however, that publics think the energy system should only be
reliant on domestic resources, as they recognise the UK energy
system is part of a global network.
The ﬁnal cluster of values emergent from our synthesis analysis
pertains to views on Process and Change inherent to energy
system transitions. This value cluster encompasses concerns
underpinning views on how transition processes should occur.
Core to this cluster is the ideal that the energy system should be
developed with a focus on the long-term trajectories being created,
and enabling improvement both in terms of socio-technological
advances and quality of life. These values are particularly evident in
ambivalent views around some supply technologies (e.g. biofuels
and CCS), negative reactions to the suggestion of certain lifestyle
changes (e.g. reducing meat consumption, ﬂying less), and
references to the difﬁculty inherent in making long-term changes
to system elements, like heating and transport provision (see
Table 1 for illustrative data points).
To elaborate, we found that public preferences towards various
technologies or proposed changes are conditional on the way they
might interconnect with other aspects of energy system change
and wider social and economic life. This underlies some of the
issues people raise in relation to biofuels, e.g. that they will
interfere with food supplies if not developed with an understand-
ing of system implications and dependencies (Table 1). This further
connects to a concern that the possible implications of changes,
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making (e.g. economic, food and water systems).
Interactions between energy system changes and cultural
systems are also embedded in this value cluster. Underlying several
different preferences is a basic concern that changes should not
reduce people’s quality of life, which includes notions around
comfort, convenience, and control amongst other things (see
Shove, 2003). Concerns about some proposed changes emerge
because they are seen to threaten aspects of quality of life. We
suggest that this underpins and helps to explain the strong
reactions that we found to ideas of eating less meat and ﬂying less
for leisure purposes, since these represented threats to core
cultural aspects of UK life—e.g. social interaction, enjoyment,
pleasure, relaxation, “experience” (Table 1). We further suggest
that other changes perceived to pose threats to quality of life and
challenge cultural values in some way are likely to meet with
similar strong resistance.
The value placed on improvement also relates to technological
development, particularly around efﬁciency as an important goal,
but also to wider impacts and implications of energy system
change in terms of well-being. As such, it connects with the public
view that transitions should be motivated by more than proﬁt-
making, and should instead ensure wider social goals are kept
integral to change processes. This is rooted in the idea that we
should address problems in ways that represent the beginnings of
new trajectories, rather than simply treating symptoms. This
aspiration underpinned some of the concerns that CCS and biofuels
raised for our participants, as these did not represent a transition
towards a long term desirable trajectory (Table 1), e.g. from ﬁnite to
renewable resources. Based on these observations we argue that
these technologies were perceived as a “non-transition”—not
representative of real change, or new trajectories (Butler et al.,
2013).
In relation to this, we therefore argue that longer-term process
based conceptions of change, rather than time-limited ones,
underpinned public views on multiple aspects of system change.
Public perspectives, as they emerged in our data, generally did not
focus on speciﬁc end-points (e.g. 2050, 2100) but instead changes
were envisaged to emerge over time (Table 1). One example of this
is in relation to heat transitions. We found that proposed
transitions away from gas central heating were perceived as
requiring greater embedding in societal and consumer options now
to allow for gradual transformations. This was as opposed to
denoting time points (i.e. 2025) where transitions to new forms of
heat will begin. This is a subtle but important element of public
views on change processes; i.e. the perception that change occurs
slowly and involves initiating new trajectories that will unfold over
long time periods.
Finally, we summarise our account of public perspectives on
energy system change with two consistent and strong preferences
that were evident throughout the data set (Table 1 ‘core
preferences’). These provide further indication of the type of
long-term trajectory publics envisage: on the supply-side this is
characterised by a strong commitment to renewable forms of energy
production and a corresponding shift away from fossil fuels. On the
demand-side it relates to an overall improvement in energy
efﬁciency and reductions in energy demand through the develop-
ment of technology and infrastructures (e.g. public transport,
demand management, electric vehicle charging points) to support
changes in lifestyles. Based on our data this comprises the public
vision for energy system change.
5. Concluding discussion
We have interrogated an extensive and in-depth set of data on
British publics' preferences with regards to current and futureenergy system change. Through this analysis we have identiﬁed a
set of social values that enable us to understand and explain
preferences for different energy system conﬁgurations, elements
and technologies. We have asserted that the identiﬁed values
provide an indication of the shared cultural ideals that people draw
on and bring to bear when engaging with notions of energy system
change.
Examining the values that underpin people’s responses is a
relatively novel way of conceptualising public perspectives on
energy system change. From the analysis, three important points
emerge. First, we propose that the interconnected nature of public
values, and as such the set of values in combination, will provide
most meaningful insight in terms of public perspectives on energy
system change. It is the set of values as a whole that is important in
understanding how public responses can emerge depending on the
particular context. We aim to show that these values are not
discrete entities but are connected to each other in multiple ways
(e.g. increased ‘efﬁciency’ is a sign of ‘improvement’), that speciﬁc
responses are informed by multiple values, and that each value
underpins and informs views on numerous different aspects of
energy system change (e.g. autonomy and power values connect to
views on DSM, operations of energy companies etc.)
Second, it is evident that public concerns are not only connected
to technological and ecological aspects of the energy system but
also to those that can be characterised as being more social or
cultural. These include, for example, threats to ﬁnances or personal
identity, concerns over lack of pace, scope and direction of change,
or power relations between different actors, and issues of (dis)trust
and mistrust. In this regard, how change is achieved is just as, if not
more, important than what is done. Similarly, public perspectives
on energy system transitions quite clearly connect with wider
social ideas and experiences that are not directly about energy per
se but pertain to broader concerns about the kinds of societies in
which we live.
Third, publics place high importance on considering overall
changes and trajectories with regards to energy system change,
rather than short-term solutions. As such, it seems that the
trajectory we are perceived to be on is paramount in informing
public acceptability more generally, and that speciﬁc preferences
or responses might play out depending on whether publics see it
ﬁtting in with a desirable long-term vision. From this we propose
that public acceptability in the short- or medium-term is likely to
be contingent on evidence of long-term trajectories towards a
broader vision of a sustainable future underpinned by the outlined
value set.
Ultimately we argue that meaningful public acceptability arises
from the connections and associations between these broader
concerns (values) and speciﬁc elements of energy system change.
For example, from our data we know that there is a strong public
acceptability of solar energy. We also know that this preference
exists because solar energy is usually perceived as ‘renewable’
‘fair’, ‘just’ and ‘clean’. Accordingly, we would predict that if a solar
power development supplying the UK but residing in North Africa
was revealed as causing local environmental contamination and
land-use territorial disputes, it would likely no longer be
acceptable to people because the associations between some of
these values and the technology will be severed. In this instance it
would still be considered ‘renewable’ but no longer perceived as
‘fair’, ‘just’ or ‘clean’. We therefore propose that public preferences
are based on the inclusion of renewable, clean, fair and just
elements in future energy systems, not solar energy technology per
se.
Therefore, this approach to understanding public perspectives
also provides some explanatory power as to how public views
might change in the future, as the energy system changes and takes
shape, and as new issues emerge. This argument is premised on the
68 C. Demski et al. / Global Environmental Change 34 (2015) 59–69notion that because existing values and experiences are important
in helping people make sense of new encounters, we can anticipate
their reactions to new energy developments (Macnaghten, 2010).
For example, from our research, we would anticipate that shale gas
does not address the overarching concerns that publics have raised
particularly because it represents a continuation of fossil fuel
regimes, which are associated with negative impacts on the
environment and human health, and unfair outcomes in terms of
the distribution of costs and beneﬁts (also see Boudet et al., 2014).
We therefore suggest that the acceptability of any particular
aspect of energy system transformations will, in part, be
conditional, upon how well it ﬁts into, or strives to be consistent
with, the social value system described. Publics are unlikely to
settle for a form of change that does not show signs of commitment
to the longer-term trajectories commensurate with these values.
5.1. Implications for conceptualising public acceptability
The values we have set out may appear idealistic and it is
important to highlight that they relate to how people think the
world should be, rather than worldviews or perceptions of how
things currently are (Kearney, 1984). Of course values interconnect
with people’s experiences and social commitments (e.g. their
relationships with others, their form of work). In this way,
preferences for particular long-term trajectories are continually
negotiated in terms of people’s everyday experiences. Naturally,
we ﬁnd tensions between values and worldviews within our data
as well; for example people can express a desire to reduce fossil
fuels yet also prefer the use of conventional cars over public
transport. However, rather than only focusing on identifying
seemingly contradictory beliefs, we argue for a focus on what
underpins these. For example, a preference for owning a vehicle
rather than rely on public transport is often associated with
comfort, control, convenience, and lower cost (e.g. cars being
experienced as more private and clean, public transport being
perceived as infrequent and relatively expensive). This way of
conceptualising public acceptability provides a basis for under-
standing public perspectives in a more meaningful way, i.e. how to
achieve broad and sustained societal acceptance for energy
transitions.
Similar we would advise against conceptualising public
acceptability (or energy system change more widely) too narrowly
in terms of simple trade-offs between potentially competing
values (e.g. calls for regulation vs. freedom of choice). Such trading-
off implies that as long as one side of the issue under scrutiny is
addressed, the others will no longer matter; one will be traded off
against the more important other. To illustrate, this implies that if
concerns about cost and affordability are greater than climate
change and energy security, then as long as cost is addressed the
other issues can be ignored or traded off against achieving this aim.
We argue that public acceptability does not work in this way and is
unlikely to be achieved if such an approach is taken (e.g. in policy
and communication around energy transitions). While aspects of
preference formation are clearly sensitive to both the contexts of
transition, and the conditionality of options on other things being
realised, simply changing the framing or salience of isolated
attributes of technologies is unlikely to achieve wider societal
acceptance. For example, public acceptability of fossil fuel power
generation, or of shale gas development, is unlikely to be changed
markedly by simply emphasising short-term cost savings, or
energy security dimensions, if the wider set of concerns that
publics have with unsustainable transitions remain largely
unaddressed.
Instead, we argue that given the stability and longevity of social
values, each identiﬁed value cluster is likely to have lasting
relevance at the societal level and it is unlikely that any of thesewill ever be completely disregarded (or completely traded-off
against another value). It is important to note that the analysis is
aimed at understanding public perspectives more broadly (e.g. to
provide ways of including these in policy decisions), and we do not
make claims about the kinds of negotiations an individual might
engage in to determine their preference about a speciﬁc
component of system change in a given context. Of course
individuals, or groups of individuals, might subscribe less to a
particular subset of the value system compared to another group.
However we would assert that the value set as a whole needs to be
considered in order to achieve meaningful public acceptability.
We would further argue that something closer to compromise
might better characterise the difﬁculty that ‘trade-offs’ invoke, i.e.
that ideal scenarios are not possible and some things will have to
be accepted in pursuit of transitions that may not be wholly
desirable (cf. reluctant acceptance of nuclear power: Pidgeon et al.,
2008). That is to say, publics are not expecting the ideal per se but
evidence that efforts are being made to strive for this are likely to
be important in acceptance of approaches and changes that are not
commensurate with the values. In line with our earlier point,
publics are unlikely to compromise on some of the core ideals for
the long-term vision, but how this is achieved may provide room
for compromise in the short-term. Critically, we propose that these
short-term compromises are, in turn, likely to be conditional on a
longer-term commitment to more sustainable trajectories under-
pinned by the identiﬁed value set.
For example, in our research we ﬁnd that CCS does not ﬁt well
within energy transitions envisaged by publics (e.g. although CCS
reduces carbon emissions it does not address other concerns
around the use of fossil fuels). Nonetheless we would argue that
the use of CCS by certain industries may be acceptable to publics
(because these industries will ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to change in the
short-term) as long as a there is a simultaneous and signiﬁcant
commitment to renewable technologies elsewhere in the system
(also see Butler et al., 2013). This reasserts the need for energy
transformations to follow a long-term trajectory that is congruent
with the value_system described. This point is also critical for
understanding public responses to elements of system change that
do not, in an obvious way, align with the values. We suggest that
these elements can still be implemented in ways that are more or
less commensurate with the values. For example, certain aspects of
demand-side management will be more acceptable to people if
they allow some form of autonomy (e.g. through override
functions), compared to developments that focus exclusively on
remote interference. In this way the values present a normative
vision for change that can provide the basis for developing policies
that are genuinely responsive to citizens’ values.
How compromises are negotiated and agreed upon is of course
a complex issue in itself, and is unlikely to be an easy process.
However, understanding public perspectives in this way is an
important ﬁrst step towards including social dimensions within
decision making around such a complex national policy issue (also
see Butler et al., 2015; Pidgeon et al., 2014).
To conclude, we advocate the consideration of public perspec-
tives beyond single elements of system change, and argue for the
relevance of examining the social values that underpin public
responses in addition to speciﬁc preferences. We assert that this
would provide a basis for more robust inclusion of public and social
perspectives in policy and scenario-building in relation to energy
futures. The identiﬁed value system provides a strong basis for
anticipating and understanding likely public responses and should
be considered alongside other more technical elements of system
change (also see Miller et al., 2013). Although this would not
guarantee the absence of contestation, a more sophisticated
understanding of public perspectives is clearly desirable if we are
to successfully develop transitions to alternative energy futures.
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